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Abstract. Over the past decades, deep learning (DL) systems have achieved
tremendous success and gained great popularity in various applications, such as
intelligent machines, image processing, speech processing, and medical diagnos-
tics. Deep neural networks are the key driving force behind its recent success,
but still seem to be a magic black box lacking interpretability and understand-
ing. This brings up many open safety and security issues with enormous and
urgent demands on rigorous methodologies and engineering practice for qual-
ity enhancement. A plethora of studies have shown that the state-of-the-art DL
systems suffer from defects and vulnerabilities that can lead to severe loss and
tragedies, especially when applied to real-world safety-critical applications.
In this paper, we perform a large-scale study and construct a paper repository of
223 relevant works to the quality assurance, security, and interpretation of deep
learning. We, from a software quality assurance perspective, pinpoint challenges
and future opportunities towards universal secure deep learning engineering. We
hope this work and the accompanied paper repository can pave the path for the
software engineering community towards addressing the pressing industrial de-
mand of secure intelligent applications.
Keywords: Artificial intelligence · Deep learning · Software engineering · Secu-
rity · Reliability
1 Introduction
In company with massive data explosion and powerful computational hardware en-
hancement, deep learning (DL) has recently achieved substantial strides in cutting-
edge intelligent applications, ranging from virtual assistant (e.g., Alex, Siri), art de-
sign [17], autonomous vehicles [13, 18], to medical diagnoses [1, 3] – tasks that until
a few years ago could be done only by humans. DL has become the innovation driv-
ing force of many next generation’s technologies. We have been witnessing on the in-
creasing trend of industry stakeholders’ continuous investment on DL based intelligent
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system [5–8,39], penetrating almost every application domain, revolutionizing industry
manufacturing as well as reshaping our daily life.
However, current DL system development still lacks systematic engineering guid-
ance, quality assurance standards, as well as mature toolchain support. The magic box,
such as DL training procedure and logic encoding (as high dimensional weight matri-
ces and complex neural network structures), further poses challenges to interpret and
understand behaviors of derived DL systems [4, 16, 24]. The latent software quality
and security issues of current DL systems, already started emerging out as the ma-
jor vendors, rush in pushing products with higher intelligence (e.g., Google/Uber car
accident [20, 40], Alexa and Siri could be manipulated with hidden command [38].
A DL image classifier with high test accuracy is easily fooled by a single pixel per-
turbation [2]). Deploying such cocooned DL systems to real-world environment with-
out quality and security assurance leaves high risks, where newly evolved cyber- and
adversarial-attacks are inevitable.
To bridge the pressing industry demand and future research directions, this paper
performs a large-scale empirical study on the most-recent curated 223 relevant works
on deep learning engineering from a software quality assurance perspective. Based on
this, we perform a quantitative and qualitative analysis to identify the common issues
that the current research community most dedicated to. With an in-depth investigation
on current works, and our in-company DL development experience obtained, we find
that the development of secure and high quality deep learning systems requires enor-
mous engineering effort, while most AI communities focus on the theoretical or algo-
rithmic perspective of deep learning. Indeed, the development of modern complex deep
learning systematic solutions could be a challenge for an individual research commu-
nity alone. We propose the Secure Deep Learning Engineering (SDLE) development
process specialized for DL software, which we believe is an interdisciplinary future
direction (e.g., AI, SE, security) towards constructing DL applications, in a system-
atic method from theoretical foundations, software & system engineering, to security
guarantees. We further discuss current challenges and opportunities in SDLE from a
software quality assurance perspective.
To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first study to vision SDLE, from the
quality assurance perspective, accompanied with a state-of-the-art literature curation.
We hope this work facilitates drawing attention of the software engineering community
on necessity and demands of quality assurance for SDLE, which altogether lays down
the foundations and conquers technical barriers towards constructing robust and high
quality DL applications. The repository website is available at:
https://sdle2018.github.io/SDLE/V1.1/en/Home.html
2 Research Methodology
This section shows the research questions, and discusses the detail of paper collection
procedure.
2.1 Research Questions
This paper mainly focuses on following research questions.
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– RQ1: What are mostly research topics and the common challenges relevant to quality
assurance of deep learning?
– RQ2: What is secure deep learning engineering and its future direction in perspective
of quality assurance?
The RQ 1 identifies the mostly concerned topics in the research community and
their common challenges, while RQ2 concerns the key activities in SDLE life cycle,
based on which we discuss our vision and future opportunities.
2.2 Data Collection Methodology
Extensive research contributions are made on deep learning over the past decades, we
adopt the following procedure to select works most relevant to the theme of our paper
repository.
– We first collect papers from conferences listed on the Computer Science Rankings
within the scope of AI & machine learning, software engineering, and security.8 To
automate the paper collection procedure, we develop a Python-based crawler to ex-
tract paper information of each listed conference since the year 2000 and filter with
keywords.
– To further reduce the search space for relevant topics, we use keywords (e.g., deep
learning, AI, security, testing, verification, quality, robustness) to filter the collected
papers.
– Even though, scraping all the listed conferences may still be insufficient, we therefore
crawl outwards – extract all the related work for each keyword-filtered paper and
crawl one level down of these papers.
– This finally results in 223 papers and we manually confirmed and labeled each paper
to form a final categorized list of literature.
Paper Category and Labeling. To categorize the selected papers, we perform paper
clustering by taking into account the title, abstract, and listed keywords. Based on fur-
ther discussion of all authors (from both academia and industry with AI, SE, and se-
curity background), we eventually identify four main paper categories, and seven fine-
grained categories in total (see Figure 1). In the next step, three of the authors manually
label each paper into a target category independently, and discuss the non-consensus
cases until an agreement is reached.
The Dataset and the Trend. Figure 1 shows the general trends of publication on se-
cure deep learning research area, where the publication number (i.e., both total paper
as well as in each category) dramatically increases over years. Such booming trend
becomes even more obvious accompanied with the milestones of DLs (e.g., DL won
ImageNet Challenge in 2012, AlphaGo defeated human championship in 2016), which
is highlighted in Fig. 2. For the four main categories, we find the most publications
are relevant to Security and Privacy (SP, 86 papers), followed by Interpretability and
Understanding (IU, 65), Testing and Verification (TV, 53), and Datasets (17).
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Total (223)
Security and Privacy (86)
Privacy (17)
Adversarial Attacks (40)
Defenses and Detection (29)
Testing and Verification (53)
Verification for DL Systems (34)
Testing for DL Systems (19)
Interpretability and Understanding (65)
Datasets (19)
Fig. 1: The accumulative number of selected publications over years
The SP category with the highest paper publication number is not surprising. Since
Goodfellow et al. [19] posted the security issues of DLs, it attracted both the AI and
security communities to escalate and burst a research competition on defending and
attacking techniques. Even though, it still lacks a complete understanding on why cur-
rent DL systems are still vulnerable against adversarial attacks. This draws the attention
of researchers on interpreting and understanding how DL works, which would be im-
portant for both application and construction of robust DLs. As the recent emerging
investment blowout in DL applications to safety-critical scenarios (e.g., autonomous
driving, medical diagnose), its software quality has become a big concern, where re-
searchers find that the different programming paradigm of DL makes existing testing
and verification techniques unable to directly handle DLs [23, 27, 33, 37]. Therefore,
we have observed that many recent works are proposing novel testing and verification
techniques for DLs, from testing criteria, test generation techniques, test data quality
evaluation, to static analysis. Meanwhile, the dataset benchmarks of different DL appli-
cation domains emerge to grow as well [15,22,35,41], in order to facilitate the study of
solving domain-specific problems by DLs (e.g., image classification, 3D object recog-
nition, autonomous driving, skin disease classification).
Common Issues. In contrast to traditional software of which the decision logic is
mostly programmed by human developers, deep learning adopts a data-driven program-
ming paradigms. Specifically, a DL developer’s major effort is to prepare the train-
ing data (including knowledge to resolve a task) and neural network architecture, after
which the decision logic is automatically obtained through the training procedure. On
one hand, this paradigm reduces the burden of a developer who manually crafts the
decision logic. On the other hand, for a DL developer, the logic training procedure is
almost like a magic-box driven by an optimization technique. Due to the decision logic
of DL is encoded into a DNN with high dimensional matrices, the interpretation and
understanding, training procedure, as well as the obtained decision logic are all very
difficult [26], which could be a root cause and a common challenge among all cate-
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2000 2010    Rise of AI           Blowout Year for AI
2001  A deterministic 
method for verification 
used to verify the 
accuracy of simple 
neural networks
2005  Adversarial machine 
learning on classification 
tasks invented
2009 Poisoning and 
evasion attacks and 
defenses of 
classification invented
2012 Deep learning wins 
ImageNet Challenge
2014  General adversarial 
networks (GANS) invented 
and a surge in adversarial 
examples
2016  Deep learning 
(AlphaGo) wins world Go 
champion Lee Sedol
2017 AI interpretability 
proposed
2017 Verification for deep 
learning invented
2018 Testing for deep 
learning invented
2018 Safety issues of 
intelligent cyber-physical 
systems are emerging
2016  Deep neural networks 
are vulnerable
2017 Adversarial attacks 
are prevalent and 
robustness issues are 
dominant
2018 Methods of 
adversarial examples 
generation are still hot
Fig. 2: Milestones of deep learning engineering relevant to security and software quality.
gories. For example, without completely understanding the decision logic of DL, it is
hard to know in what particular case an adversarial attack could penetrate, and how we
could defend against such attacks. In the case of testing, extensive studies are performed
on analysis of traditional software bugs, their relations to software development activ-
ities, as well as techniques for defect detection. However, a comprehensive empirical
study and understanding on why DL bugs occur still could not be well explained, let
alone the root case analysis.
3 Secure Deep Learning Engineering Life Cycle
Due to the fundamental different programming paradigms of deep learning and tradi-
tional software, the secure deep learning engineering practice and techniques are largely
different with traditional software engineering, although the major development phases
could still be shared.
We define Secure Deep Learning Engineering (SDLE) as an engineering disci-
pline of deep learning software production, through a systematic application of
knowledge, methodology, practice on deep learning, software engineering and
security, to requirement analysis, design, implementation, testing, deployment,
and maintenance of deep learning software.
Figure 3 shows the key development phases of SDLE. In the rest of this section,
we first describe each of the key development phases, their uniqueness and difference
compared with traditional practices in software engineering, and then we discuss the
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Fig. 3: Secure deep learning engineering life cycle
security issues in current SDLE. In the next section, we explain the quality assurance
necessity in SDLE life cycle, and highlight the challenges and opportunities.
Requirement Analysis. Requirement analysis investigates the needs, determines, and
creates detailed functional documents for the DL products. DL-based software decision
logic is learned from the training data and generalized to the testing data. Therefore, the
requirement is usually measured in terms of an expected prediction performance, which
is often a statistics-based requirement, as opposed to the rule-based one in traditional
SE.
Data-Label Pair Collection. After the requirements of the DL software become avail-
able, a DL developer (potentially with domain experts for supervision and labeling)
tries to collect representative data that incorporate the knowledge on the specific tar-
get task. For traditional software, a human developer needs to understand the specific
task, figures out a set of algorithmic operations to solve the task, and programs such
operations in the form of source code for execution. On the other hand, one of the most
important sources of DL software is training data, where the DL software automatically
distills the computational solutions of a specific task.
DNN Design and Training Program Implementation. When the training data be-
come available, a DL developer designs the DNN architecture, taking into account of
requirement, data complexity, as well as the problem domain. For example, when ad-
dressing a general purpose image processing task, convolutional layer components are
often included in the DNN model design, while recurrent layers are often used to pro-
cess natural language tasks. To concretely implement the desired DNN architecture, a
DL developer often leverages an existing DL framework to encode the designed DNN
into a training program. Furthermore, he needs to specify the runtime training behaviors
through the APIs provided by the DL framework (e.g., training epochs, learning rate,
GPU/CPU configurations).
6
Runtime Training. After the DL programming ingredients (i.e., training data and train-
ing program) are ready. The runtime training procedure starts and systematically evolves
the decision logic learning towards effectively resolving a target task. The training pro-
cedure and training program adjustment might go back-and-forth several rounds until a
satisfying performance is achieved. Although the training program itself is often writ-
ten as traditional software (e.g., in Python, Java), the obtained DL software is often
encoded in a DNN model, consisting of the DNN architecture and weight matrices. The
training process plays a central role in the DL software learning, to distill knowledge
and solution from the sources. It involves quite a lot of software and system engineering
effort to realize the learning theory to DL software (see Figure 3) over years.
Testing & Verification. When the DNN model completes training with its decision
logic determined, it goes through the systematic evaluation of its generality and qual-
ity through testing (or verification). Note that the testing activity in the AI commu-
nity mainly considers whether the obtained DL model generalizes to the prepared test
dataset, to obtain high test accuracy. On the other hand, the testing activity (or verifica-
tion) in SDLE considers a more general evaluation scope, such as generality, robustness,
defect detection, as well as other nonfunctional requirement (e.g., efficiency). The early
weakness detection of the DL software provides valuable feedback to a DL developer
for solution enhancement.
Deployment. A DL software passed the testing phase reaches a certain level of qual-
ity standard, and is ready to be deployed to a target platform. However, due to the
platform diversity, DL framework supportability, and computation limitations of a tar-
get device, the DL software often needs to go through the platform calibration (e.g.,
compression, quantization, DL framework migration) procedure for deployment on
a target platform. For example, once a DL software is trained and obtained on the
Tensorflow framework, it needs to be successfully transformed to its counterpart of
TensorflowLite (resp. CoreML) framework to Android (resp. iOS) platform. It
still needs to go through on device testing after deployment, and we omit the testing
phase after deployment for simplicity.
Evolution and Maintenance. After a DL product is deployed, it might experience the
procedure of modification for bug correction, performance and feature enhancements,
or other attributes. The major effort in evolution and maintenance phases relies on the
manually revision on design, source code, documentation, or other software artifacts.
On the other hand, DL software focuses more on comprehensive data collection, DL
model continuous learning (e.g., re-fitting, retro-fitting, fine tuning, and re-engineering).
Security Issues in DL. The current practice of security in deep learning has fallen
into the trap that many other domains have experienced. Almost every month new at-
tacks are identified [9, 11, 14, 19, 30, 31, 44] followed by new countermeasures [32, 43]
which are subsequently broken [11, 21], and so on ad-infinitum. There is a broad and
pressing need for a frontier-level effort on trustworthiness and security in DL to break
this cycle of attacks and defenses. We have a unique opportunity at this time—before
deep learning is widely deployed in critical systems—to develop the theory and practice
needed for robust learning algorithms that provide rigorous and meaningful guarantees.
If we rethink the SDLE life cycle (see Figure 3), security vulnerabilities can happen in
almost every step. For instance, for the training related steps such as Requirement Anal-
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ysis, Data-Label Pair Collection and DNN design and training, poisoning attacks can
easily happen via manipulating training data. In the testing related steps, such as testing
& verificationand deployment, evasion attacks can take place by perturbing the testing
data slightly (e.g. adversarial examples). In addition, when deploying the DL software
to different platforms or with different implementation frameworks, there will always
be opportunities for adversaries to generate attacks from one to the other.
We believe many of these security issues are highly intertwined the quality of cur-
rent DL software, lacking systematic quality assurance solutions over the entire SDLE
process which is largely missed in research works as described in the next section.
4 Towards Future Quality Assurance of SDLE
Over the past decades, software quality assurance discipline [34, 36] has been well-
established for traditional software, with many experiences and practices widely applied
in software industry. However, the fundamentally different programming paradigm and
decision logic representation of DL software make existing quality assurance tech-
niques unable to be directly applied, forcing us to renovate the entire quality assur-
ance procedure for SDLE. In this section, we pose our vision and challenges on quality
assurance in SDLE to guide future research.
From the very beginning of SDLE, we need to rethink how to accurately define,
specify, and document the of DL software requirement, especially for the functional
requirements. This leaves us a question whether we should follow a statistical based
approach, a rule based approach, or their combination, which has not been well investi-
gated yet.
The training data play a key role in shaping the learning process and DL decision
logic. However, most current research treats the training data as high quality for granted,
without a systematic quality control, inspection and evaluation process. As poisoning
attacks show, many incorrect behaviors and security issues could be introduced with the
maliciously tweaked training data. How to select the suitable size while representative
data would be an important question. In addition, data supervision and labeling process
is also labor intensive and error prone. For example, ImageNet dataset contains more
than one million general purpose images. We also need to provide assistance and quality
control for the labeling procedure.
It becomes even more challenging, when it comes to the training program imple-
mentation and runtime training. Most state-of-the-art DL frameworks are implemented
as traditional software on top of the DL software stack. Even the learning theory is
perfect, it still has a big gap to transfer such ideally designed DL models to a DL ap-
plication encoded on top of the DL framework. One big challenge is how to ensure the
software stack (e.g., hardware drivers, DL library, DL framework) correctly implements
the learning algorithm. Another challenge is to provide useful interactive support of the
training process. Most current DL training procedure only shows training loss (accu-
racy), validation loss (accuracy), which is mostly a black box to a DL developer. When,
the training procedure goes beyond expectation, the root cause analysis becomes ex-
tremely difficult, which may come from the DL architecture issue, training program
implementation issue, or the hardware configuration issue. Hence, the software engi-
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neering community needs to provide the novel debugging, runtime monitoring, and
profiling support for the training procedure, which is involved with non-determinism
and runtime properties hard to specify.
The large input space has already been a challenge for testing and verifying tra-
ditional software. Such a challenge is further escalated for DL software, due to its
high dimensional input space and the internal latent space. Even though, traditional
software testing has already explored many testing criteria as the goal to guide test-
ing. How to design a suitable testing criteria to capture the testing confidence still re-
mains unclear. Even with some preliminary progress on testing criteria designed for
DLs [25,27,33,37], there are many more testing issues needed to be addressed, such as
how to effectively generate tests [29,42], how to measure the test data quality [28], and
how to test DL robustness and vulnerabilities [10, 12].
Further DL challenge comes up with current deployment process: (1) target de-
vice computation limitations, and (2) DL framework compatibility across platforms.
The DL software is mostly developed and trained on severs or PCs with GPU support.
When it needs to be deployed on a mobile device or edge device with limited computa-
tion power, the DL software must be compressed or quantized for computation/energy
efficiency, which could introduce defects. How to ensure the quality and detect the po-
tential issues during this process is an important problem. In addition, the current DL
frameworks might not always be supported by different platforms. For example, the
Tensorflow is not directly supported by Android or iOS, and how to make DL soft-
ware cross-platform compatible would be an important direction. Finally the quality
assurance concerns in DL software evolution and maintenance are mostly focused on
avoiding introducing defects during change, which might rely on regression testing.
However, how to effectively evolve the DL software still remains unknown, which we
leave as an open question for further study.
5 Conclusion
Considering deep learning is likely to be one of the most transformative technologies in
the 21st century, it appears essential that we begin to think how to design fully fledged
deep learning systems under a well-tested development discipline. This paper defines
the secure deep learning engineering and discusses the current challenges, opportuni-
ties, and puts forward open questions from the quality assurance perspective, accom-
panied with a paper repository. We hope our work can inspire future studies towards
constructing robust and high quality DL software.
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